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illOR LAW-illOR-MAN°AGEMENT RELATIONS ACT-DISPARAGEMENT OF
EMPLOYER'S PRODUCT As PROTECTED CoNCERTED AcTIVITY-When contract
negotiations between an employer, a Charlotte, North Carolina TV station, and
a local union representing the station's technicians reached an impasse, the
technicians remained on the job but circulated handbills attacking the inferior
quality of the employer's programs. These handbills, which were distributed
throughout Charlotte as well as on a picket line which the technicians maintained during their off-duty hours, were signed simply 'WBT Technicians"
and made no reference to the labor dispute. The company discharged the
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technicians, whereupon the union £.led a complaint with the National Labor
Relations Board charging a violation of sections 8(a)(l) and 8(a)(3) of the
amended National Labor Relations Act.1 The Board upheld the company's
right to £.re those employees responsible for distributing the handbills, on the
ground that such conduct was "indefensible" under the circumstances and
therefore outside the protection of section 7 of the NLRA. However, the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed, holding that concerted
activities do not lose the protection of section 7 unless they are "unlawful."
On certiorari, held, reversed, Justices Frankfurter, Black, and Douglas dissenting. The Board was correct in not ordering reinstatement of these employees
since their discharge was "for cause" within the meaning of NLRA section
IO(c).2 NLRB v. Local Union No. 1229, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 346 U.S. 464, 74 S. Ct. 172 (1953).
"In its essence," said Justice Burton speaking for the majority, "the issue is
simple."3 But, surprisingly enough, the majority apparently felt it unnecessary
to resolve the question upon which the court below and the NLRB had disagreed.4 Instead, the Court turned to the "discharge for cause" proviso of
section IO(c), a provision which had not even been mentioned by either the
Board or the court of appeals, and which indeed has received relatively little
judicial attention since its addition to the NLRA in 1947. Exactly why the
majority took this approach to the case is not made clear, but at least two
possibilities suggest themselves. One possible explanation is that the majority
proceeded on the assumption that the scope of section 7 has been to some extent
narrowed by the section IO(c) proviso; i.e., the majority may have felt that
some activities which would have been considered protected but for the proviso
may now constitute cause for discharge. This is apparently not the position
which has been taken by the NLRB. 5 Nor does this interpretation of the IO(c)
proviso receive much support from its legislative hlstory.6 In fact, the opinion
as a whole gives little indication that the Court actually intended to subscribe
1 Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. L. 136 (1947), as amended, 29
U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §§ 158(a)(l), 158(a)(3). The former section makes it an
unfair labor practice for an employer "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7," which provides that employees shall
have the right to engage in concerted activities "for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection.•••" 61 Stat. L. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952)
§157. Sec. 8(a)(3) forbids employer discrimination to encourage or discourage union
membership.
2 61 Stat. L. 146 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §l60(c), which
provides: "No order of the Board shall require the reinstatement of any individual as an
employee .•• if such individual was suspended or discharged for cause." s Principal case at 471.
4 The court of appeals seems to have been in error in deciding that ''lawfulness" is the
proper test. For discussions of the court of appeals' decision reaching this conclusion see
Gregory, "Unprotected Activity and the NLRA,'' 39 VA. L. REv. 421 (1953); 66 HARv.
L. REv. 1321 (1953); 4 SYRACUSE L. REv. 377 (1953).
5 See NLRB, TmRTEENTH ANNuAL REPORT 81 (1948).
6 See H. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 38, 39, 55 (1947), and the statements of Senator Taft, 93 CoNc. REc. 6518 (1947).
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to such a view. Justice Burton's approach is probably better explained by a
feeling on the part of the majority that because the handbills had not been
issued "in the context of a conventional appeal for support of the union in the
labor dispute," 7 their distribution was "separable" from, and therefore not to be
treated as, activity which even initially falls within the ambit of section 7. Of
course under this view there would be no need to consider the nature of the
test to be applied in determining the existence of an implied exemption from
section 7's protection. This rationale, however, would seem to constitute a
departure from the well-established practice of treating conduct (such as that
here involved) which comes within the literal terms of section 7 as protected
unless it is found to be "indefensible" or, perhaps, "illegal."8 But whatever the
real basis for the principal case may be,9 in view of repeated references to the
lack of connection between the labor dispute and the handbills' distribution,
it is fairly clear that notwithstanding some language to the contrary, the Court
did not intend to assert as a general proposition that activity is withdrawn from
section 7's protection simply because it may reasonably be characterized as "disloyal." Nevertheless, the result of the case seems to indicate that the Court
will hold unprotected any union conduct which it regards as highly questionable and which may somehow be "separated" from a labor dispute. Thus, not
only has the Court left unanswered the problem which troubled the court of
appeals, but by apparently resting its decision upon a rather vague concept of
separability it has raised new and unnecessary doubts regarding the protection
to be accorded concerted activities.
George B. Berridge, S.Ed.

1 Local Union No. 1229, IBEW, 94 N.L.R.B. 1507 at 1512 (1951). The majority
placed considerable emphasis upon the fact that the handbills did not on their face disclose
the existence of a labor dispute. But could not the reader be expected to deduce the existence of a dispute? And what about the picketing, which would certainly tend to spread
knowledge of the controversy throughout the city?
8 Of course not all concerted activities are "for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection." See, e.g., Joanna Cotton Mills Co. v. NLRB, (4th Cir.
1949) 176 F. (2d) 749. For discussions of the scope of §7 see Cox, "The Right to Engage
in Concerted Activities," 26 hro. L.J. 319 (1951); Petro, "Concerted Activities-Protected
and Unprotected," 1 Lui. L.J. 1155 (1950), 2 Lui. L.J. 3 (1951).
9 The Court did indicate that "even if the attack were to be treated, as the Board has
not treated it, as a concerted activity wholly or partly within the scope of those mentioned
in §7, the means used by the technicians in conducting the attack have deprived the
attackers of the protection of that section, when read in the light and context of the
purpose of the Act." Principal case at 477. The latter half of this statement represents the
type of analysis usually employed in §7 cases; the reference to the Board's treatment of the
attack seems to be in error. In reaching its conclusion the Court may have been influenced
by the fact that the technicians remained at work which conducting their attack (see
principal case at 476), although the Board specifically discounted this factor. Local Union
No. 1229, IBEW, note 7 supra, at 1510.

